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Abstract
I make some basic observations about hard takeoff, value alignment, and coherent extrapolated volition,
concepts which have been central in analyses of superintelligent AI systems.
I. On Hard Takeoff
The distinction between hard takeoff and soft
takeoff has been used to describe different possible
scenarios following the arrival of human-level
artificial intelligence. The basic premise underlying
these concepts is that software-based agents
would have the ability to improve their own
intelligence by analyzing and rewriting their
source code, whereas biological organisms are
significantly more restricted in their capacity for
self-improvement [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
There is no precise boundary between the two
scenarios, but in broad strokes, a hard takeoff
refers to a transition from human level intelligence
to superintelligence in a matter of minutes, hours
or days. A soft takeoff refers to a scenario where
this transition is much more gradual, perhaps
taking many months or years. The practical
importance of this qualitative distinction is that in
a soft takeoff, there may opportunities for human
intervention in the event that the initial AI systems
have problematic design flaws.
The purpose of this brief note is simply to point
out the following: takeoff speed refers to the rate of
change of the agents’ level of intelligence, and not our
perceived changes in the world around us. Because
the notion of an “intelligence explosion” has been
constructed in analogy to a physical explosion
[6], it gives rise to an inaccurate mental picture
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in people’s minds. If self-improving AI systems1
are thought to be the intellectual analogue of
nuclear chain reactions, then the natural image
of an intelligence explosion that this metaphor
creates is a scenario in which massive, disruptive
changes take place in the world that are difficult
for individuals and for society to handle.
However, the premise of intelligent agents with
capacities in substantial excess of any human
being, which are able to process the sum total of
human knowledge in the form of books, video,
and ongoing contemporary events implies that
greater levels of intelligence in the AI systems
will be accompanied by actions taken with a
corresponding level of information, insight, and
operational skill. Therefore, if the initial systems
are designed correctly with respect to value
alignment and goal structure stability, it is in fact
a hard takeoff scenario which would be less dis-
ruptive than a soft takeoff, not the otherway around.
I reiterate this claim for emphasis: The takeoff
speed of an intelligence explosion refers to the rate
of change of intelligence in the AI systems, and
not our perceived changes in the world around
us. Therefore, under the assumption of correctly
designed systems, a hard takeoff is preferable to
a soft takeoff because the resultant changes that
1As this analysis neither requires nor implies that the driving
force of change is a unitary agent, I have chosen to use the plural
terms “software-based agents,” “AI systems," or “superintelli-
gent AI systems.” It may very well be a collection of agents /
systems possessing powerful AI capabilities in aggregate.
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take place in the world will be executed with
greater precision, thoughtfulness, and insight.
II. On Value Alignment and Coherent
Extrapolated Volition
The preceding argument relied on a key assump-
tion, namely that the AI systems capable of self-
improvement were designed correctly with respect
to value alignment and goal structure stability.
Value alignment refers to the construction of sys-
tems that take actions consistentwith humanvalues.
Russell states 3 design principleswhich encapsulate
the notion of value alignment [7]:
1. The machine’s purpose must be to maximize
the realization of human values. In particular,
it has no purpose of its own and no innate
desire to protect itself.
2. The machine must be initially uncertain about
what those human values are. The machine
may learn more about human values as it goes
along, but it may never achieve complete cer-
tainty.
3. The machine must be able to learn about hu-
man values by observing the choices that we
humans make.
A related notion is Yudkowsky’s “coherent
extrapolated volition” [8, 9]. The basic premise
of this proposal is that sophisticated AI systems
will be capable of extrapolating and resolving
disagreements between the value systems of
individuals and groups, ultimately arriving at a
goal structure that represents the collective desires
of humanity. This process of iterated reflection is
analogous to Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” [10].
Like the metaphor of hard takeoff, the notions of
value alignment and coherent extrapolated volition
can also give rise to an inaccurate mental picture,
namely, that the aligned goal structure would either
require or result in all humans arriving at complete
agreement on all issues. However, with adequate
resources, it may very well be that value-aligned
AI systems shape a world in which groups of in-
dividuals co-exist who disagree about object-level
issues. Certainly we can point to many examples
in contemporary human society where individuals
maintain divergent preferences without conflict.
The purpose of this brief note is simply to point out
the following: Implicit in any practical analysis of
value alignment are the physical resources avail-
able to the AI systems. In particular, the construc-
tion of a human compatible goal structure does
not mean that all human disagreements have been
resolved. Rather, it means that a mutually satis-
factory set of outcomes has been achieved, subject
to resource constraints.
It may be impossible to arrive at a consensus goal
structure without adequate resources. As a trivial
example, if we have two individuals each of whom
desires at least one apple, there is no disagreement
if we have two apples. On the other hand, if there is
only one apple, conflict may very well be inevitable
in the absence of other factors with which to resolve
the imbalance between specific individual desires
and total available resources. In the context of su-
perintelligent AI systems capable of exerting sub-
stantial influence on the world and shaping society
on a global scale, adequate analysis of value align-
ment requires an understanding of the sum total of
physical resources that the AI systems have at their
disposal.
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